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VIRGINIA COMMENTS
NOTES
EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ON VIRGINIA LAW
SELLER'S REMEDIES AND ARTICLE 2
The Uniform Commercial Code sets forth in detail the remedies
available to the seller when the buyer breaches a sales contract. In
general these are the same as those previously available in Virginia,
but the UCC gives the seller a somewhat wider range of remedies.
Under Virginia case law, the location of title to the goods at
the time of the breach determined the remedy.' Title, as a significant
concept, has been almost eliminated in the UCC,2 so that while the
same remedies are given, the results are reached by different routes.
A buyer may breach a sales contract at different points in the
transaction. The remedies will vary, depending upon when the buyer
breached the contract. (i) When the buyer breaches a sales contract
after having accepted the goods, the seller may: (a) bring an action
for the price; or (b) in certain situations reclaim the goods. (2) When
the buyer breaches the contract after the seller has delivered the goods
to a carrier, the seller may stop the goods in transit. (3) When the
buyer refuses to accept goods when tendered, the seller may: (a) re-
scind the contract; (b) resell the goods and bring an action for any
damages sustained; (c) retain the goods and collect damages; or (d)
bring an action for the price in special situations. (4) When the buyer
'Birdsong & Co. v. American Peanut Co., 149 Va. 755, 141 S.E. 759 (1928); J. B.
Colt Co. v. Elam, 138 Va. 124, 120 S.E. 857 (1924).
rrhe elimination of the concept of passage of title is emphasized in the
comment to UCC § 2-1oi, which reads:
"The legal consequences are stated as following directly from the contract
and action taken under it without resorting to the idea of when property
or title passed or was to pass as being the determining factor. The purpose
is to avoid making practical issues between practical men turn upon the lo-
cation of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove
by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and
actions of a tangible character."
Section 2-401 provides, "Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights,
obligations and remedies ... applies irrespective of title to the goods except where
the provision refers to such title."
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makes an anticipatory repudiation of the contract, the seller may:
(a) await the time for performance, tender the goods, and then pro-
ceed as in any other case of nonacceptance; or (b) bring any action im-
mediately that would be appropriate, treating the breach as having
occurred at the scheduled time of performance.
REMEDIES WHEN BUYER HAS ACCEPTED THE GooDs
The UCC provides two remedies for a seller when a buyer with
possession of the goods refuses to pay for them. Section 2-709(i)(a)
provides that the seller may bring an action for the price of the goods.
Under Virginia case law in order to bring such an action, title must
have passed to the buyer.3 The UCC also provides for the recovery
of incidental damages, a point not covered by Virginia cases.
Under section 2-702(2) the seller who has delivered goods to an
insolvent buyer may reclaim the goods if he acts within ten days.
This provision changes Virginia law, as stated in James v. Bird's
A dm'r,4 in which it is said that the vendor of personal property has
no implied or equitable lien on the goods for the purchase money and
that he must look solely to the personal responsibility of the vendee.
If the buyer has misrepresented his solvency to the seller, in writing
and within ten days prior to the delivery of the goods, under this
section of the UCC the ten-day limitation does not apply. Virginia in
Oberdorfer v. Meyer5 recognized a similar right on the part of a
seller, whose buyer has fraudulently misrepresented his solvency, to
reclaim the goods, although in the case relief was denied because the
goods had passed into the hands of parties who had taken without
notice.
This right of reclamation given by the UCC gives the seller such
a preference over other creditors that such a reclamation bars all
other remedies. 6
The UCC also recognizes the seller's right to reclaim the goods
where delivery has been made to the buyer conditional upon pay-
3Birdsong & Co. v. American Peanut Co., supra note i; Geoghegan & Sons v.
Arbuckle Bros., 139 Va. 92, 123 S.E. 387 (1924); Pleasants v. Pendleton, 27 Va. (6
Rand.) 473 (1828).
435 Va. (8 Leigh) 510 (1837). See also Trigg. v. Bucyrus Co., ioj Va. 79, 51
S.E. 174 (19o5).
188 Va. 384, 13 S.E. 756 (1891).
GUCC § 2-702(3) and Comment, Point 3.
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ment of the price, which is not received,1 or where a check, which
is subsequently dishonored, is taken in payment.8
REMEDIES WHERE BUYER BREACHES WHILE GOODS ARE IN TRANSIT
The UCC provides that the seller may under certain conditions
stop goods in transit although the goods are in the possession of a car-
rier and no longer under the control of the seller, so that under tra-
ditional doctrines title would have passed to the buyer. If at such a
time the buyer becomes insolvent,9 if the method of payment fails,
as because of government regulation, 10 or if the buyer refuses to make
a payment then due," the seller may stop goods in transit. This right
to stop delivery is always limited so that the carrier will not be
harmed.' 2 There is the further limitation that, except in the case of
the insolvent buyer, such stoppage of delivery is available only as to
carload, planeload or similar large quantities.
13
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has only considered the
insolvency situation, allowing the seller to stop the goods in transit
where the buyer became insolvent.
14
REMEDIES WHERE BUYER R.EJECTS THE GOODS
The UCC provides four remedies for the seller when the buyer
wrongfully rejects the goods tendered:
(i) The seller may cancel the contract, 15 a remedy which, although
never actually given in any case, is said to be available under Vir-
ginia law.10
(2) The seller may resell the goods and collect damages. 17 Although
the same remedy has been available under case law,' 8 the UCC con-
'UCC § 2-507(2) and Comment, Point 3. This comment indicates that the right
is waived if not exercised within ten days. However, the text of the UCC does not
contain such a limitation and there is no cross-reference to UCC § 2-702, dealing










"Howatt & Co. v. Chalmers, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 34 (816).
'5UCC § 2-7 03 (f).
1
"Rosenbaums v. Weedon, Johnson & Co., 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 785, 790 (1868)
(dictum).
1.UCC §§ 2-7 03 (d), 2-7o6.15Rosenbaums v. Weedon, Johnson & Co., supra, note 6.
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tains explicit provisions in section 2-7o6 regarding the requirements
to be followed in making such a sale, and in section 2-7o8 regarding
the damages recoverable.
While the sale must be made in a "commercially reasonable"
manner it may be either public or private. Where the resale is to be
private, the buyer must be given reasonable notice of the seller's in-
tent to resell and hold the buyer for damages. A public sale must be
held in the usual place for such sales and unless the goods are perish-
able or such as may speedily decline in value, notice must be given the
buyer. Unless the goods are in view of those attending a public sale,
adequate provision must be made for inspection by prospective buyers.
The seller is free to buy at a public sale. A seller does not have to ac-
count to the buyer for any profit made on a resale, and if there is a
deficiency he may maintain an action for damages. In order to facili-
tate resale, the UCC provides that the purchaser at either a public
or private resale takes free of the claims of the original buyer, even
though the seller has failed to comply with the statutory provisions
for resale.
Virginia case law similarly requires the seller to use "reasonable
diligence" in making a resale, 19 and it has been said that, unless good
faith requires otherwise, the sale should be at public auction.20 The
seller is required to give notice of his intention to resell and to hold
the buyer for damages, but he does not have to give notice of the sale
itself2' and so he does not have to give notice of the time and
place of resale.2 2 Under Virginia case law the seller is said to act as
agent of the buyer in carrying out resale23-a doctrine not recognized
in the UCC. The damages recoverable under section 2-708 are com-
parable to those recoverable under Virginia case law.
2 4
(3) The seller may retain the goods and under section 2-7o8 bring
an action for damages measured by the difference between the con-
tract and market prices at the time and place of tender, plus incidental
damages incurred, and less any expenses the seller is saved by the
breach. Virginia cases have recognized this same remedy with the
1AMayflower Mills v. Hardy, 138 Va. 138, 120 S.E. 861 (1924).
Rosenbaums v. Weedon, Johnson & Co., supra, note 16.
21American Hide & Leather Co. v. Chalkley, loi Va. 458, 44 S.E. 705 (193o).
3Walker v. Gateway Milling Co. 121 Va. 217, 92 S.E. 826 (1917); Rosen-
baums v. Weedon, Johnson 8- Co., supra, note 16.
- Baker-Matthews Lumber Co. v. Lincoln Furniture Mfg. Co. 148 Va. 413,
139 S.E. 254 (1927).
"Mayflower Mills v. Hardy, supra, note ig; Rosenbaums v. Weedon, Johnson
& Co., note 16.
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same measure of damages, 2  except that Virginia has never specifically
made an award to cover incidental damages.
If this measure of damages, i.e., contract price less market price
and costs saved the seller, is inadequate; then the UCC provides that
the measure of damages shall be the profit lost.26 Virginia cases recog-
nize that where the goods have not yet been manufactured, the measure
of damages is the contract price less cost of manufacturing and deliv-
ery,2 7 or profit loss because of the buyer's breach;2 8 these are situations
in which any measure of damages other than profit lost would also
seem to be inadequate under the UCC. Virginia has not allowed this
measure of damages in other circumstances contemplated in the UCG.
(4) The seller may maintain an action for the purchase price if
the goods were identified to the contract prior to the buyer's breach
and with reasonable effort the goods cannot be sold at a reasonable
price.2 9 If the seller resorts to this remedy, he must hold the goods for
the buyer, unless resale subsequently becomes possible, and upon
payment of the judgment, the buyer is entitled to the goods. Since
under Virginia law the position of title is determinative of the remedy
available, an action for price could not be maintained unless title had
passed to the buyer while possession remained in the seller.
30
REMEDIES AVAILABLE BEFORE TIME FOR PERFORMANCE
Section 2-609 of the UCC provides that when the seller, prior to
the time for his performance, has reasonable grounds for insecurity
as to the buyer's performance, the seller may require "reasonable as-
surance" from such buyer, and suspend performance until it is received.
A failure by the buyer to give the assurance within thirty days consti-
tutes a repudiation of the contract.
'Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. v. Chapman, 74 Fed. 444 (4 th Cir. 1896); Sanitary
Grocery Co. v. Wright, 158 Va. 312, 163 S.E. 86 (1932); Wessel, Duval & Co. v.
Crozet Cooperage Co., 143 Va. 469. 130 S.E. 393 (1925); James River Lumber Co.
v. Smith Bros., 135 Va. 406, 116 S.E. 241 (1923).
3UCC § 2-708(2).
'Tidewater Plumbing Supply Co. v. Emory Foundry Co., 141 Va. 363, 127 S.E.
87 (1925); Norfolk Hosiery & Undenvear Mills Co. v. Aetna Hosiery Co., 124 Va.
221, 98 S.E. 43 (1919); Duke v. Norfolk & V. Ry., io6 Va. 152, 55 S.E. 548 (1906);
Worrell & Williams v. Kinnear Mfg. Co., 103 Va. 719, 49 S.E. 988 (19o5); Alleghany
Iron Co. v. Teaford, 96 Va. 372, 31 S.E. 525 (1898).
-'A.I.M. Percolating Corp. v. Ferrodine Chemical Corp., 139 Va. 366, 124 S.E.
442 (1924).
'UCC § 2-709.
• Montauk Ice Cream Co. v. Daigger Co., 141 Va. 686, 126 S.E. 681 (1925). A
dictum in Rosenbaunis v. Weedon, Johnson & Co., supra, note 16, which indicates
that an action for price will lie although title is still in the seller, was explained
on another basis in this case. 141 Va. at 701-02.
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In Smokeless Fuel Go. v. W. E. Seaton & Sons3l assurance in the
form of an indemnity bond was sought by a seller who questioned
the ability of his buyer to perform. However the court did not grant
such relief because it found that it was not warranted by the circum-
stances. Howatt & Co. v. Davis & Chalmers32 contains the statement
that where prior to delivery to the actual buyer, the seller discovers
that the buyer is likely to become insolvent, the seller may stop goods
in transit.
If the buyer actually becomes insolvent before the seller performs,
the seller may refuse delivery except for cash and payment of past
deliveries, and may stop goods in transit 33 unless the carrier has acted
in such a way that stoppage would work an injustice upon him. 34
Virginia case law allows the seller whose buyer becomes insolvent
to stop goods in transit,3 5 and it seems self-evident that he could sus-
pend performance without fear of legal sanction.
Section 2-61o of the UCC governs the remedies available when the
buyer actually makes an anticipatory repudiation. The seller may
(i) await performance for a "commercially reasonable" time, or (2)
bring any action which he would be entitled to bring36 if the seller
had breached at the scheduled time for performance. In either case
he may suspend his own performance, or proceed under section 2-764,
which permits the seller faced with anticipatory breach to identify to
the contract: (a) conforming goods in his possession or control at the
time he learned of the breach, or (b) to complete goods not then com-
pleted but demonstrably intended for the particular contract, or (c)
to cease manufacture and salvage uncompleted goods.
Virginia has recognized the doctrine of anticipatory breach in only
one sales case. In Virginia Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Hughes,37 the
court said that upon learning of the breach the seller was under a
duty to recognize the situation, terminate relations, and sue for
damages.
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code provides the
nlO5 Va. 170, 52 S.E. 829 (19o6).
2Supra, note 14.
'3UCC § 2-702(l).
mUCC § 2-705 .
3Howatt & Co. v. Davis & Chalmers, supra, note 14.
"'UCC § 2-61o(b) provides that such actions may be brought even though the
seller has previously asked the buyer to reconsider his repudiation.
814o Va. 249, 124 S.E. 283 (1924). For non-sales cases on anticipatory repudiation
see: Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Taylor, 99 Va. 208, 37 S.E. 854 (19o); Lee
v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 97 Va. s6o, 33 S.E. 556 (1899); James v. Kib-
ler's Adm'r, 94 Va. 165, 26 S.E. 417 (1896).
